Opening his book with prescient comments from such contrasting figures as Alexis DeToqueville and Adolf Hitler, John Gaddis es

As a child enters a classroom and opens up his history text, there is a high probability that he will come in contact with one of America’s great wars. Wars have served as benchmarks in history, and often symbolically define who we are as Americans. Our heritage is built upon the struggle for independence in the Revolutionary War, or our role as the guardian of the world’s freedom in World War II. The Civil War and the War in Vietnam remind us of when we almost came apart at the seams. Our wars remind us that we are an independent, freedom loving people.

So what of the Cold War? What was accomplished, and what was lost? This “war” dominated political events for nearly half a century, yet there were no great battle songs that came from it, and no clear message. It was evident as the twentieth century wound down that the Soviet Union had lost; indeed, that very country had ceased to exist. Yet it puzzled scholars how this war came to be, whether it was inevitable or could have been avoided, and whether it deserved the time and resources poured into it. Such was the challenge before two authors who came up with very different results. John Gaddis’ We Now Know and Melvyn Leffler’s Preponderance of Power illustrated how difficult this war was to define, as it seemed at times that they were describing different epochs.

Opening his book with prescient comments from such contrasting figures as Alexis DeToqueville and Adolf Hitler, John Gaddis established that this earth was destined to be dominated for a time by two superpowers: the United States and the Soviet Union. When the earth had plenty of “elbow room,” these two titans were able to coexist peacefully despite their ideological differences, even uniting for a time on a common battlefield. But as advances in communication and transportation shrank the world, a clash was unavoidable.

Or was it? There were other countries that existed with equally differing philosophies of government. Why would these two prove to be such a constant source of irritation for each other over a forty-year period? After years of research and 400 pages of discussion, what Gaddis concluded of what “we now know” seemed like too simple of an answer—an answer that would have fit comfortably in a 1950’s propaganda film. Gaddis placed all the blame for the Cold War squarely on the broad shoulders of Josef Stalin. Gaddis conceded that other leaders had their faults, shortsightedness, and exaggerated feelings of self-importance, but it was the force of this one man’s personality that brought the entire world to the brink of self-destruction. Josef Stalin’s penchant for intimidation and brute force was evident

within the international system, within his alliances, within his country, within his party, within his personal entourage, [and] even within his family. The Soviet leader waged cold wars on all these fronts. The Cold War we came to know was only one of many from his point of view…. It tells us a lot that as [Stalin’s structural legacy] disappeared, so too did the Cold War and ultimately the Soviet Union itself.[1]

This was truly a monumental individual. But Gaddis’ characterizations all too often fit neatly into stereotypical roles. Stalin was the brute force intimidator, Nikita Khrushchev (often compared to an alcoholic[2]) was the somewhat bumbling, insecure exaggerator, Dwight Eisenhower was the crafty old war hero, Chairman Mao was the fawning pawn of Stalin, and Fidel Castro was the unpredictable young revolutionary. Such characterizations seemed more appropriate for a Rambo movie than a serious examination of the Cold War. Yet Gaddis’ reasoning reflected the thinking of the time; by simplifying the theme and defining Stalin as the enemy, a bipolar world was much easier to deal with.[3]

Gaddis continually extolled the virtues of “American democracy.”[4] Countries actually begged the U.S. to come in and occupy them[5] with their kind, freethinking democratic soldiers. Meanwhile the Soviet Union had to force their alliances. The Soviets were certainly not welcome in East Germany, where their soldiers raped two million German women in the Soviet occupation zone. Gaddis implicated Stalin for these rapes, blaming his brutal system of force and his casual attitude toward soldiers who indulged as “deserving a little fun.”[6] So, “we now know” that the Soviet Union was the Evil Empire.

Gaddis provided many interesting comparisons between the U.S. and USSR that often expounded his good vs. evil model. Woodrow Wilson’s Fourteen Point Address was given January 1918, two months after the Bolshevik coup. Both wanted to change the world. Vladimir Lenin wanted the Proletariat everywhere to revolt, and Wilson wanted the League of Nations to supersede national interests. Both visions died soon thereafter: the United States soon gave up its role as world leader and the Soviet Union became a bureaucratized state far from its original ideals. Another comparison Gaddis analyzed was between Stalin and Hitler. Stalin was portrayed as less of an ideological fanatic and more patient with his goals. Hitler was willing to die for his Aryan race; Stalin was willing to kill to keep himself alive. Gaddis compared the differing versions of “security” that each country sought. While the West sought collective security for the common good (such as the U.N.), Stalin sought security by eliminating potential challengers. Stalin could not comprehend how Roosevelt and Churchill did not have absolute power to do anything they wanted. The United States could not comprehend why the USSR wouldn’t be interested in the U.N. or in the World Bank. Stalin mistrusted everybody, including his own doctors, which ultimately led to his death. There was little evidence that Roosevelt or Churchill mistrusted Stalin until well into 1945. The U.S., used to “democracy,” used civility and minimal constraint in its alliances. It encouraged a free flow of ideas and deferred to lesser powers.[7] The USSR, only knowing authoritarianism in its history, stifled its allies with micromanagement and intimidation. When Stalin met resistance, he tried to smother it. If the Americans met resistance, they would compromise with it. Germany provided an interesting comparison of the two systems. West Germany had three times the population (it would have had more if the clamps weren’t shut at the borders) and five times the economic output. These results were because the West could choose its own government. Between 1945-1961, one out of six East Germans escaped to the West. Nobody went the other direction. West Germany had two times the land as well, after the USSR gave Silesia and other East German areas to Poland, which didn’t help Soviet popularity in these areas. (None of these facts were mentioned in Marvin Leffler’s book, which will be examined later in this paper).

Stalin was even mistrustful of allies and of foreign communism. Whereas Lenin and Trotsky wanted to encourage communism to spring up spontaneously around the globe as workers realized their rights, Stalin felt it was very important that all control of these events should remain in Moscow. More specifically, all control of these events should remain within himself, by force if necessary. It was interesting that he did not believe China would really become communist, and continued dealing with Chiang Kai-shek over a period of time.

Gaddis did not focus exclusively on Stalin. When discussing Chairman Mao, Gaddis may have exposed his own anti-hippie political leanings. He explained that “The Great Leap Forward,” which imposed that each family expend their efforts producing their own steel, resulted in a neglect of crops that led to a mass famine from which 20 million died. Because of this, “[t]he Chairman, whose visage once adorned the t-shirts and dormitory walls of his western admirers, therefore probably holds the record as the greatest mass murderer of all time.”[8] These were particularly strong words after Gaddis had established Stalin’s villainy.

Gaddis pointed out that when Khrushchev saw the importance of humanizing and popularizing the Soviet system and denounced Stalin, he undermined his own position as the unquestioned leader of international communism, and Mao became a rival. Thus, the Warsaw Pact had to be held together under even more intimidation than under Stalin, in order for Khrushchev to maintain control. He often exaggerated Soviet military capabilities even to his allies in the hope of inspiring fear. Instead, he just got some confused allies who couldn’t understand why he wasn’t backing up his words with a force that he didn’t have. Mao became quite disillusioned with Khrushchev over this,[9] as he interpreted that Khrushchev’s lack of provocative action against the U.S. was an indication that Khrushchev had abandoned Marxism-Leninism altogether.

Castro was an interesting character. Here was a revolutionary without a cause, leading his band of merry men to a new Cuba. He essentially chose communism because he saw that as a way to prevent future elections and thus maintain his own power. He also knew it would irritate his neighbors to the north, which was a source of some delight. The developments in Cuba came as a surprise to the USSR, but these young ideologues reminded the aging Politburo of their younger days after the Bolshevik Revolution.[10]

Gaddis dedicated a chapter to the purpose of nuclear warheads. The most expensive and deadly weapons ever were also the most useless. They just stood and stared at each other. But they also prevented the Cold War from becoming hot. There were scuffles in Third World countries, but nuclear warheads were not used in them. These wars never developed into World War III, at a time when the next world war seemed as inevitable as the next Super Bowl, which also used Roman numerals. Nuclear warheads turned statesmen into theatrical actors, each having to play the tough guy. Kennedy had to put up a stance that he was more willing to go to war than Eisenhower, even though Eisenhower was an old warrior, and Kennedy was a dove[11].

Gaddis went to great lengths to defend events that have traditionally been viewed as American diplomatic embarrassments. Even though the U-2 was brought down in a much-publicized incident, the spy planes had also let U.S. officials know how much Khrushchev had been exaggerating about his missile capabilities. The USSR had known for quite a while that U-2’s were spying on them, but were embarrassed that they couldn’t do anything about it.[12] The Bay of Pigs incident was often considered the low point of the Kennedy administration. Ironically, “we now know” the Bay of Pigs actually deflated Khrushchev’s feelings about Cuba, as he realized its vulnerability.[13] Up to that point, Castro was to Khrushchev as Mao had been to Stalin, in a sort of father-son relationship.[14]

Gaddis closed his writings with the Cuban Missile Crisis, which to Gaddis was the beginning of the end of the Cold War and of the Soviet Union. There were certain pieces of information that Gaddis uncovered that we now know. For example, Kennedy would have made a deal if necessary—withdraw missiles from Turkey if the USSR would withdraw missiles from Cuba.[15] Although the crisis is generally considered an American victory, there were certain elements that were in the Soviets’ favor. This crisis was an indication to the world that the Soviet Union was a legitimate rival to the United States, an image that lasted for thirty more years. Plus, Cuba had been saved from a U.S. invasion, which was the Soviets’ original goal. But also because of this event, any moral, ideological, cultural, or economic example the Soviets had set had lost its appeal. From this point, the Soviets would float along as an empty shell, propped up by its military strength, for the next thirty years.[16]

While Gaddis’ good vs. evil conclusions may have seemed too simplistic for some historians, they did reflect how most Americans saw the Cold War.[17] Many Americans were concerned about the totalitarian, godless communists. Though this book was written with many new documents recently available, there was the sense that the major conclusions of the book remained apparently unaffected by any new light. It was odd that a book with the title We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History would offer anything but a revisionist viewpoint. The converse was true with this next book.

As Melvyn Leffler opened his book, he stated in the preface that because of limited access to Soviet documents, he was unable to dwell on Soviet aims and motives. Rather, he chose to focus on the U.S. side of the equation.[18] The result was that Leffler gave us an extreme close-up of U.S. foreign policy during the Truman administration, warts and all. His story was dominated by political infighting, rivalries between the armed services, and disagreements among allies. When he did explore Soviet actions, he often tried to defend them, or at least present their point of view. He often illustrated how provocative U.S. actions were, and how threatened “the Kremlin” must have felt.[19]

Leffler spent very little time discussing the evils of the godless communists, but rather explored how the motivations for the Cold War were primarily economic. For example, according to Leffler, the war in Vietnam was a war to maintain a non-communist source of raw materials for a more important country, Japan. This would, in turn, keep Japan economically westward-oriented.[20] This was the logic that pervaded U.S. officials’ memoranda, and indicative of the extent of risk and cost that the officials would be willing to put on the table so they could gain a worldwide preponderance of power for the U.S.

Whereas Gaddis explained that Soviet aggression was an aversion to other countries and they had to bully their way into occupation, Leffler emphasized that the U.S. was primarily afraid of the Soviet system being attractive to neutral or recently nationalized countries. There was really no good reason for former enemies Germany or Japan to be especially attracted to the West. Many of the recently nationalized countries were in the process of throwing off the yoke of Western colonialists and saw the West, not the Soviets, as the bad guys. (Gaddis did mention communist success in the Third World, but wrote that it was an insignificant issue).[21] This fear of Soviet attractiveness was a major element in the memoranda that Leffler presented. Leffler did not mention what Gaddis emphasized: the rampant raping of German women, enslaving German men into the Siberian coalmines, and other Soviet international atrocities. Regarding the Soviets bullying their way into occupation, Leffler wrote that the Soviets were anything but aggressive in their acquisition of countries, at least outside of their immediate periphery. And that periphery was acceptable, according to the Yalta agreements (a fact that Gaddis did not mention).

The strongest contrast between the two books was the reasoning of who was to blame for the Cold War. Gaddis had made a strong case for Stalin, saying his whole life was a cold war. Leffler, on the other hand, barely mentioned Stalin. In fact, more often was the Soviet leadership described as “the Kremlin,” as Molotov and others took a prominent role in Soviet decision-making and diplomacy. Leffler acknowledged Stalin’s brutality, but Russia’s problems were Russia’s business, and U.S. officials did not display any moral outrage over purges and other events within Soviet borders.[22] Soviet sins may have affected the attitude of the American public, but it was not the purges that shaped U.S. foreign policy, as Stalin remained diplomatically circumspect.

In much the same way that the first World War planted the seeds for the second, World War II set the stage for the Cold War. The primary cause Leffler presented for the Cold War was the exaggerated fears of both countries, coming after World War II when totalitarian dictators tried to take over the world. The U.S. and USSR fought on the same side then, and feared the same issues. These fears led to “foolish errors.”[23] Some of the foolish errors of the Americans were overestimating the value of third world markets and resources, overestimating the Soviet Union’s ability to capitalize on nationalism, and believing Ho Chi Minh and other nationalist communists would be more loyal to Moscow than to their own countrymen.

Another aspect of World War II that led to the Cold War was that Europe was decimated as a result. Like a body ravaged by disease, a flattened Europe was vulnerable to any virus that came along. And communism looked pretty inviting to a people without money or hope, and was especially popular at that time.

World War II convinced the United States that the days of its isolationism were over. The U.S. established bases around the globe to reduce vulnerability from attack from any country, near or far. The U.S. wanted to control ports and bases from the Mediterranean Sea to the Pacific Islands. This desire to hold bases in far off lands continued to be a major impetus in the Cold War, as the U.S. wanted to be prepared 100 years ahead for any potential enemy.

Whereas Gaddis stated that the Cold War was inevitable due to the natures of the two countries and Stalin’s personality, Leffler saw that much could have been avoided and perhaps we could have averted the forty-year escalation that was the Cold War. The U.S. tended to think in worst-case scenarios, a common practice in wartime to keep defenses up. But that could have unnecessarily inflated issues beyond their true magnitude. Too many steps of reverse psychology could transform priorities beyond logic. Leffler contended that Soviet aims were more limited (i.e. just to Eastern Europe) than the U.S. or Britain realized.[24] The mistrust just spiraled. As a result, the U.S. often found itself aligned with any unpopular, corrupt, incompetent ruler who would deny communism and accept U.S. assistance, which sometimes included bribes and covert operations. It was an ironic situation, given the Americans’ heritage, that they were supporting European imperialists over those who wanted to rule their own country. This irony was not lost on Ho Chi Minh, who had based Vietnam’s new Declaration of Independence on the American model. Moral abhorrence to communism was another inconsistency, as the U.S. supported Tito in Yugoslavia when he broke from Stalin’s tutelage, but remained a communist.

Leffler chose to rotate through areas of the world with each chapter. This allowed him to give chronological updates of each critical area. The world was divided into industrialized nations, the third world, and the Soviet bloc. It was critical that the U.S. attract former enemies Germany and Japan into the western orbit. These were industrialized nations with enormous potential. With the eastern half of Germany already communist, and Japan surrounded by communist countries, these two nations with no real ties to the West were vulnerable to Soviet enticement. Secondary in priority were the peripheral areas of the third world, which contained raw materials necessary for the industrialized nations. The Middle East had petroleum; Southeast Asia had petroleum, tin, and rubber. These areas were volatile and tired of Western domination, a fact that caused U.S. officials great worry. Leffler’s chapters had the subheadings of Western Europe, Southeast Asia, and the Middle East to give updates on these developments. The Soviet bloc was a lower priority, and this area was not given much attention in this book.

Aside from the economic motivations of the Cold War, another dominant theme in Leffler’s book was the political infighting within Harry S[25] Truman’s cabinet, or the different departments of government. Truman entered the Presidency as one of the least prepared for the job, and relied heavily on his advisors until he gained more confidence. He soon hired former Vice President James Byrnes as Secretary of State, but in actuality, Byrnes served as “Assistant President,”[26] especially in foreign affairs. One problem was that Byrnes was secretive, scornful, and had very few friends in Truman’s early cabinet. Truman’s cabinet finally pacified and harmonized with the replacing of Byrnes with an aging but still much respected George C. Marshall. However, the State Department continued to be at odds with the War Department or the Joint Chiefs of Staff at the Pentagon, as each department argued over jurisdiction or budget allotments. The Army argued with the Air Force about how much money should go into more airplanes. The military may have exaggerated the threat of the Cold War so they could get more funding.[27] Truman and Acheson often found themselves attacked by Republicans in Congress and adjusted their priorities to shield themselves from the bitter bile spewing from the likes of Joseph McCarthy. Douglas MacArthur was acting insubordinate and irresponsible (Gaddis had much praise for MacArthur’s policies in the Japanese occupation,[28] Leffler did not include any such praise in his book).

U.S. officials had to overcome problems with their allies as well. France remained constantly nervous of the rehabilitation of Germany. Their memory was too long to soften the effects of skirmishes with the Germans over the Alsace-Lorraine, or Hitler doing the jig in the shadow of the Eiffel Tower. Similarly, the Pacific nations of Australia, New Zealand, and the Philippines were nervous of a revitalized Japan. Sometimes these fears overcame their sense of the greater good of bringing these former enemies into the Western orbit. However, it was Robert Schuman from France and Konrad Adenauer from West Germany who buried their swords and constructed the European Coal and Steel Community, a landmark in European relations and the forerunner to today’s European Community. Yet even a plan as progressive as this needed to be sold to the citizens of France, with whom Schuman did not have much of a mandate.

For both Gaddis and Leffler, the titles they chose for their books were featured prominently in their overall themes. Whereas Gaddis felt that “we now know” a lot more than we used to due to the recent declassification of Soviet documents, Leffler illustrated that the primary goal of the United States during the Truman administration was to establish a “preponderance of power,” and presence around the globe. Their motivation was not offensive like Caesar, Napoleon, or Hitler, but defensive. They wanted to control areas before the Soviets got them, or else they would find themselves very lonely when searching for trading partners. Unfortunately, the Soviets saw these actions as provocative, and thus the great race for arms began.

There were still some major aspects and events of the Cold War left unexamined by either of these books. Images remain of two cold warriors named Richard Nixon and Leonid Brezhnev signing SALT treaties, and Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev bringing a new vision of the world to Reykjavik, Iceland. However, these were conscious choices by the authors to limit the scope of their research. But it would have been nice to at least have a chapter on these episodes, as it may have provided better closure.

If the Cold War was not the “War to End All Wars,” then certainly it was the war that changed the way wars were run. While there were skirmishes and even wars within this war, this was a war that existed primarily at the negotiating table. It was a war without a first shot fired and without a truce agreement drawn up. It was a war where countries were afraid to use the full extent of their weapons. It was a war that devoured the largest amount of economic resources ever devoted to battle. Yet the purpose and meaning still escaped historians, even as the books were closing on the final chapters of this era. A totalitarian regime had been deposed, and a country vaulted itself to world superpower status, yet there were no ticker tape parades to welcome home the victors. There was only the sense that the world had just removed the loaded gun from its own forehead.