Nisei Divided

By Rob Hellebrand

On December 7, 1941, the Imperial Japanese Navy launched a surprise attack upon United States bases at Pearl Harbor. Two months later, a presidential executive order authorized the evacuation and internment of over 100,000 American citizens who were of Japanese descent. However, in 1944, the United States Army instituted the draft among eligible Japanese-Americans. Many Japanese-Americans welcomed this development as a chance to pledge their allegiance to the United States. Yet a significant number of internees resisted the call. Their refusal was not due to a lack of patriotism. Rather, they believed resistance would be the best way to demonstrate their loyalty to what they considered the true American spirit as defined by the founding fathers. The resisters would willingly enlist when their rights and status of citizenship could be “clarified.” They viewed this resistance not just as a fight for themselves, but for all Japanese-Americans and indeed all minorities who might find themselves under similar circumstances. Many were jailed, and many were heavily criticized by other Japanese-Americans who considered these resisters traitors to the cause. However, after years of bitterness and misunderstanding within the Japanese-American community, a bitterness that belied the stereotype of a homogeneous and subservient Japanese population, the efforts of the draft resisters began to become recognized and honored.

While the United States is essentially a “nation of immigrants,” many cultural groups have struggled to assimilate into this pluralistic society. Some groups of immigrants have found easier acceptance than others, usually because of religious, ethnic or racial identities that appear “American.” Immigrants who could be classified as minorities have often had to grapple with how they too could gain acceptance into their adopted land. Issei and Nisei (first- and second-generation Japanese immigrants) are among those who have struggled to become acknowledged as true Americans. Matters reached a head when the United States was at war with Japan during World War II. Yet the intransigence of this campaign is evidenced by the fact that Issei remained barred from citizenship until 1952, and it is apparent that the events of Pearl Harbor were only partly responsible for the prevailing feelings of prejudice.

In the mid- to late-nineteenth century, thousands of Chinese joined the California gold rush. Although most were sojourners, planning to just get what they could and then leave, the number of Chinese who did stay alarmed other California residents. In 1860, all 34,933 Chinese Americans lived in California. In 1880, of the 104,468 Chinese Americans, 75,132 lived in California, while another 12,696 lived in the other Pacific states, Oregon and Washington.1 Many stayed to work on the Central Pacific Railroad that would eventually connect with the Union Pacific to become the first transcontinental railroad. Chinatown prospered as a viable community in San Francisco. However, these achievements were met with continual cries of "The Chinese Must Go."2

When Japanese immigrants began moving onto American soil at the beginning of the 20th century, the European immigrants didn't see much difference. As stated by James Duval Phelan, who was serving as mayor of San Francisco at the time,

The Japanese are starting the same tide of immigration which we thought we had checked twenty years ago... The Chinese and Japanese are not bona fide citizens. They are not the stuff of which American citizens can be made.3

President Theodore Roosevelt was concerned about anti-Japanese legislation in such places as San Francisco and attempted to head it off with a so-called “Gentlemen’s Agreement,” of 1907-1908, which ended immigration of Japanese laborers to the United States by having the Japanese refuse to issue passports to these laborers.4

Nativist legislators continued to enact increasingly stringent immigration policies throughout the first half of the twentieth century. This included quota systems that seemed aimed at decreasing the less desirable sources of immigration, including Asian countries. In 1924, an immigration act trumped the Gentleman’s Agreement and barred Japanese totally as “aliens ineligible for citizenship.”5

On December 7, 1941, many were able to justify their history of prejudice as Japan attacked Pearl Harbor in open aggression against the United States. The day after Pearl Harbor, the Los Angeles Times reported:

We have thousands of Japanese here... Some, perhaps many... are good Americans. What the rest may be we do not know, nor can we take a chance in the light of yesterday's demonstration that treachery and double-dealing are major Japanese weapons.6

Despite the later historical evidence that most Japanese immigrants were in fact very patriotic toward their adopted country, all Japanese were now under suspicion. Even those born in the United States, who had never been to Japan, whose Japanese vocabulary consisted of sayonara and little else, were suspect simply by virtue of where their parents and grandparents were born. This largely unfounded fear of a fifth column led to the issuance of Executive Order 9066 by President Franklin D. Roosevelt on February 19, 1942 (see document 1).[7] Two months after the bombing of Pearl Harbor, fear and prejudice against Japanese-Americans had swollen to an unprecedented level. The prevailing concern necessitated that the United States government create plans of evacuation of over one hundred thousand people, mostly American citizens, from their homes. The irony was not lost on many Nisei and Issei: as Americans were fighting one system of concentration camps, they were building another.

The basic premise of Executive Order 9066 was that in a time of war, the military can take command of any geographic area and forcibly remove anyone. Decisions of who was to be removed were to be at the discretion of the military. There was no mention in the order that exceptions should be made for those who were citizens, those who owned property, or those too young to be accountable or too old to safely make the trip. There was no stipulation that any formal charges be brought against anyone; this actually made it harder to contest, as guilt or innocence was not an issue taken into consideration. Officially this order was a relocation of civilians, not an internment of criminals. The semantics were hardly comforting to those affected. It was ironic that there was no evacuation of Japanese from the very territory that was attacked. Removing Issei and Nisei from Hawaii would have crippled its economy. California was much less dependent, yet much more afraid, of the yellow peril.

Within six weeks of the Executive Order, Civilian Exclusion Orders were drawn up, with more specific detail of how this mass exodus would be executed (see document 2).[8] Unlike E.O. 9066, there was no attempt to explain the overall purpose of the relocation. These notices simply contained the cold facts of what the evacuees would be permitted to take with them as they were carted to “Reception Centers.” Services were promised that would allow the civilians to sell, rather than just leave behind, their homes, household goods, and livestock. “Transport persons” were allowed a limited amount of clothing and equipment to keep for the trip. Storage would be provided, but at the risk of the owner. Curfews were set. Evacuees may have noticed that there was no mention of what was beyond these mysterious Reception Centers or the length of time that they would be gone from their homes. They were only told to report to a certain site at a certain time with whatever they were to bring for the trip, and there receive further instructions. What was to prevent them from thinking they were heading for a similar fate as the Jews and Gypsies across the Atlantic? Although they were not in fact being sent to death camps, they were to be placed under constant military scrutiny from guard towers and a life behind barbed wire. Photographs of the era document this forced removal (see document 3).[9] Little children, tagged like baggage, have faces that were innocent of bitterness. Older Issei faces seemed to express confusion and disappointment while holding a sense of stoicism. In the end, 120,000 were removed from their comfortable homes, sometimes at gunpoint, to deserted areas called Tule Lake and Manzanar in California, Poston and Gila in Arizona, Rohwer and Jerome in Arkansas, Minidoka, Idaho; Topaz, Utah; Amache, Colorado; and Heart Mountain, Wyoming. That aspect recalled the Trail of Tears blazed a century earlier, as these modern-day refugees were sent to some of the most forsaken land in the United States.

Within days several people challenged aspects of the forced removal. Min Yasui was a former law student at the University of Oregon. After his graduation, the only place he could find a job was as an employee of the Japanese consulate in Chicago. Upon the news of what the Japanese had done in Pearl Harbor, he resigned his post at the Japanese embassy immediately. Despite his obvious show of patriotism, he was relocated just as all others of his heritage. Yasui decided to violate the curfew. One evening, he decided to walk around the streets of Portland, Oregon, where he eventually contacted police and asked to be arrested. Yasui wanted to challenge the new regulations in the courts, calling it a "test case." He was eventually found guilty.

The Japanese American Citizens League (JACL) had little support for Min's test case (see document 4).[10] This was early evidence that there would be opposing ideas within the Issei/Nisei community regarding how to behave toward perceived oppressors. The JACL clearly established a policy that opposed challenging the U.S. government in the courts. The JACL asserted that, “Individuals and groups are not important when the life of the nation is at stake.” They considered it to be “[cooperating] in the war effort” by following orders to evacuate themselves from the Pacific states. The memo listed eleven reasons why obedience and subservience were necessary. Many of these reasons centered on public opinion of other Americans. The JACL was convinced that by capitulating to the government’s demands, this would finally win over the trust and good will of other Americans. Conversely, test cases would only upset people and result in “unfavorable publicity.” Much of the semantics of the letter played upon the deep-seated Japanese culture of self-sacrifice for the greater good. It characterized actions like Min's as being committed by “self-styled martyrs” who “capture the headlines.” A memo released by the JACL instructed Japanese-Americans to “remember that it is much easier to be a martyr than it is to be a quiet, self-suffering, good citizen.”

The JACL recognized the possibility that this would not be a popular position among their own people, already feeling the criticism of their “seemingly indifferent stand.” Seven months later a relocation camp newsletter, the Minidoka Irrigator, pled not only with the JACL but all Nisei not to abandon Min (see document 5).[11] It cited the authoritative (and unquestionably American) voices of Senator Robert Taft and Judge James A. Fee. Both Taft and Fee doubted the constitutionality of the curfew laws. Taft was quoted as calling the edicts “the sloppiest criminal law I have ever seen or read anywhere.” Fee, despite his decision to convict Min, ruled, “without the declaration of martial law, the military has no power to regulate the life of the ordinary American citizen.” The editorial did not explain the reason for the judge's apparent contradiction of convicting Min while limiting the military's power. (Although one reason could have been that Min could not be defined as an ordinary citizen because of his earlier ties to the Japanese consulate office). Primarily, this editorial called for Nisei, who had been critical of the JACL, to stop wasting their energy criticizing each other and constructively do something to help Min and others in his plight.

Fred T. Korematsu did not set out to challenge the relocation act with a test case; he simply hid from it. Actually he claimed he was Mexican and went to work in a shipyard, helping the war effort, but was eventually caught by the FBI. His defense team decided to challenge the constitutionality of the Executive Order, but they lost and Korematsu was convicted. Eventually the U.S. Supreme Court heard his case in December 1944, in a landmark decision that upheld the legality of his incarceration. On the way up the appellate process, in December 1943, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals heard Korematsu’s case and also decided against him. However, one of the judges, Judge Denman, wrote a dissenting opinion (see document 6).[12] Among other items, he stated that when “as a war necessity, such wrongs are deliberately committed upon it's [sic] citizens by a civilized nation, ordinary decent standards require that compensation must be made.” He wrote that the “claimant should look to Congress for this remedy.” Here was a judge who went on record to state that not only was this relocation wrong, but that compensation was due to the victims of military orders. Property had indeed been lost by those forced to move with only days’ notice. This issue would really not be resolved until the Civil Liberties Act of 1988, which partially compensated each survivor of E.O. 9066 for about $20,000. The surviving families of those who did not live until 1988 did not receive any money.

The recently formed Fair Play Committee at the Heart Mountain, Wyoming relocation camp found hope in Judge Denman’s words. Here was evidence that maybe the JACL was wrong, and that displaced Nisei and Issei really did have a case worth fighting for. The memo that described Judge Denman’s views stands as evidence of the political activity and discussion going on at these relocation camps, with Kiyoshi Okamoto named as an early leader of the Fair Play Committee. There was promise of future announcements and activity.

Another twist in this ironic tale brought matters to a head. On January 20, 1944, the Secretary of War, Henry L. Stimson, upgraded all Nisei from 4-C (enemy alien status) to be potentially eligible for 1-A (patriotic recruit status). The U.S. Government wanted to draft the previously undraftable out of the camps and have them serve their country. This action resulted in the all-Nisei 100^th Battalion and the 442^nd Infantry. These units were some of the most decorated in the entire war effort, as many members strived to prove their loyalty with superhuman valor. Although most Nisei did register for the draft, a significant and vocal minority had had enough, and flocked to join the Fair Play Committee (FPC) and other such movements, who resisted the draft until their citizenship status could be clarified. By mid-February the FPC was holding regular meetings and had 275 dues-paying members.[13]

As chairman of the FPC, Kiyoshi Okamoto prepared several drafts of a statement alternately entitled "Loyalty is a Covenant" (see document 7)[14] and "We Should Know" (see document 8)[15] in response to this latest edict by the U.S. government. In language that recalled the Declaration of Independence, while also referring to the Constitution and Abraham Lincoln, Okamoto set forth his very American interpretation. Okamoto argued that the government was designed to protect its citizens, and that loyalty between citizens and government was a two way street. Recalling Thomas Jefferson's criticism of King George, Okamoto declared that, “The President himself broke the [covenant] when he caused the evacuation of 118,000 People without due process of law.” To deny basic human rights to a segment of its population was un-American and against everything the country had fought to preserve. Okamoto reminded his readers that the authoritative voice of Abraham Lincoln once established that, “If by the mere force of numbers a Majority should deprive a Minority of any Constitutional Right, it might in a moral point of view justify a revolution.” Okamoto assured the readers that he was not inciting a revolution, but that “the evacuation, the pauperization, deportation, the concentration, the detention, the denial of freedom and justice without any finding of guilt” was not in accordance with how the country should treat its citizens. “In truth,” he summed up, “all the guarantees of the Constitution are denied us.”

Without a full slate of civil liberties afforded by virtue of U.S. citizenship, Nisei questioned the status of their rights. If Nisei were not full citizens, what were they? Were they enemy aliens? “The absence of clarification of our status and rights is the keystone of our indecision towards any proper orientation of attitude toward the draft.” This was indeed the crux of the argument throughout 1944 for many Nisei. As citizens, they maintained they would quite willingly fight for their country. But under the nebulous classification of citizens without rights, they had no country to fight for. They decided to patiently wait for a clarification of their status before moving forward with the draft process. They fought not only for themselves, but also for “the other Minorities who otherwise, may face a similar fate in the future.”

With that, the Fair Play Committee composed a letter of protest to the draft boards (document 9),[16] which basically informed the boards why the “draft law was not intended for” them. Maintaining that they were “true and loyal Americans,” they reserved the right of protest and challenge. Using the aforementioned statements by Judge Denman and Abraham Lincoln, they considered it their duty to defend the Constitution against this “traitorous act.”

Some Nisei took this argument one step further and called for full draft resistance, expatriation, and even a renewed allegiance to Japan. This was more than what the Fair Play Committee was asking for: they were simply trying to re-establish their constitutional rights. The FPC found a sympathetic voice in the Rocky Shimpo, a newspaper published in Denver that boasted the “Largest Circulation of Nisei Vernacular in [the] Continental U.S.” The editor of the English section, James Omura, never affiliated himself with the FPC but found he would often champion their views. Omura was alarmed at the more extreme reactions of some of the more disenchanted Nisei, and wrote an article encouraging them to “Let Us Not Be Rash” (see document 10).[17] Omura argued that the sporadic draft resisters were too few in number, too disorganized, and too unsound in their reasoning. There was no reason to become disloyal or refuse to defend the country. Omura agreed with the FPC when he wrote that, “the government should restore a large part of those rights before asking us to contribute our lives to the welfare of the nation,” but not to the extent that Nisei act with “rashness or haste.” He implored, “Let us therefore not condemn democracy but the men who manipulate public affairs and the masses who sympathize and condone undemocratic ideals.” He concluded with, “There is no reason why we should not petition for a redress of grievances, but there is every reason why we should not resist the draft in the way it is being done now.”

The reaction of the FPC obviously surprised federal authorities and officials from the War Relocation Authority (WRA). According to the Rocky Shimpo (document 11),[18] when five FPC members were asked why they hadn't appeared for their pre-induction physical, they simply replied, “I do not know whether I am an American citizen or not as an enforced resident of this concentration camp.” Though the FPC members were ready to be sent to jail over this assertion, the seemingly befuddled authorities simply sent them home. The Rocky Shimpo may have revealed their editorial bias by giving this story a banner headline, and explaining that the FPC's logic was too much for the authorities.

The next day, the official camp newspaper, the Heart Mountain Sentinel expressed their opinion, which disapproved of “the so-called Fair Play Committee, which was conceived in the mind of one of the center's most persistent and clever trouble makers” (see document 12).[19] This editorial completely supported the arrest of those who failed to respond to their pre-induction physical examinations. The writer blamed the Issei for deluding the youths, as it was asserted that the Issei were ambivalent in their feelings about fighting against their former homeland. It called the FPC a “minuscule minority of embittered persons who have lost faith not only in themselves and their futures but in life itself.” It blamed the FPC for “bringing criticism on all persons of Japanese ancestry” and the Japanese Empire for their present situation of living behind barbed wire. The basic theme of the editorial was fear that public opinion would turn against the Nisei because of this “small disgruntled group,” and attempted reassurance that “the majority of nisei and their parents believe wholeheartedly in selective service.”

It did not take long for Paul Nakadate to respond to that editorial (see document 13).[20] In a letter to the editor, Nakadate accused the Heart Mountain Sentinel of “the weakest and cheapest editorial I've seen.” He sensed that the Sentinel knew better than the inaccurate picture it attempted to paint. He asked, “Why cannot the outside public know of our genuine feeling instead of putting an artificial front in accordance with WRA policy? If the Sentinel is going to be the Sentinel of this Camp I should like it to have it come out clean and straight.” He criticized the Sentinel's logic that since the FPC was small in numbers then they must be wrong. He stated that, “democratic rule is not only the rule of the majority but the protection of the minority.” This concept was probably not lost on the other Nisei, as they themselves were a minority outside the barbed wire.

The same day the Sentinel published Nakadate's letter, the editorial came out with even stronger language against the FPC, describing them as “Janus-faced individuals [who] proceed rat-like with stealthy approach to intimidate and even threaten with bodily harm those who oppose them” (see document 14).[21] This language seemed to echo the vernacular of theAmerican press regarding “sly Japs.” The Sentinel editorial reported that, “in the hidden recesses of boiler roomsand latrines... leaders of the Fair Play Committee have fired with fanatical zeal the weakermembers.” It claimed that the FPC's “mimeographed statements are purposely ‘toned-down’ for public consumption,” and did not accurately reflect their true “rhetoric or wild-eyed statements of its leaders.” The underlying motivation again seemed to be public opinion. There were statements such as, “The entire community of Heart Mountain will be watching,” “They are not looked upon with any kindness... by their fellowmen nor by the government,” and the ultimate motivation for Nisei to fight for this country, to prove themselves to others. The Sentinel thanked the Army for “giving loyal nisei the opportunity to prove that they are men among men and not whimpering weaklings who are afraid to prove themselves.” The editorial failed to clarify which of these whimpering weakling FPC members were threatening people with bodily harm. The editorial coldly closed with, “it is time the group falls into line.”

The following day, Frank Emi, one of the founding members of the FPC, wrote a scathing four-page reply to this latest editorial (see document 15).[22] He challenged the Sentinel editors to produce any evidence of any of their charges regarding cloaked meetings and intimidation in latrines. He called upon another reading of the Constitution, and defended the FPC with:

If these persons [the editors] feel that what they say is right, that what they write is being loyal, why do they not volunteer their services to the combat unit? Why do they not back up their convictions with parallel action? To sit in an office and write bold words does not take courage.... We members of the FPC sincerely believe that we are doing the right thing as loyal American citizens in fighting for our rights and in trying to uphold our Constitution. We are backing up our convictions with our stand, regardless of the consequences.

The next day, the Rocky Shimpo (document 16)[23] condemned the Heart Mountain Sentinel for reversing its stand from its previous criticism of the War Department's decision to open selective service. It unabashedly defended the FPC from the attack of the Sentinel, which “has the audacity and brazen ego to support efforts to crush and destroy... the Fair Play Committee.” Omura accused the writers of being turncoats for being in favor of carting the protesters off to jail.

On the same front page as that editorial, the Shimpo[24] reported that the Heart Mountain site was on the verge of a camp-wide strike against the “dictatorial attitude of W.R.A. administrative officials toward camp internees.” The FPC called for the dismissal of Project Director Guy Robertson for incompetence, and charged the W.R.A., the JACL, and the Heart Mountain Sentinel for conspiracy.

With charges flying against them, the FPC held a meeting (open to visitors) to clarify their position (document 17).[25] As evidence against the Sentinel's theory of secret agendas in these meetings, the notes of the meeting clearly restated:

that the aim of the F.P.C. is not to dodge the Selective Service as some people seem to think or would like to have you think. The aim of the F.P.C. is to fight for our rights as American Citizens as outlined by the Constitution and the Bill of Rights. A person whose only disire [sic] is to dodge the draft is not wanted.

There were also references to rumors of their financial situation and to members of the FPC who had been sent to Tule Lake, including their chairman, Kiyoshi Okamoto, and Isamu Horino. The FPC now had a system of rotating leaders. The main message of this meeting was that the FPC was going to carry on, despite the loss of some of their leaders.

Okamoto had been sent to Tule Lake Segregation Camp on charges of disloyalty. (In 1943, Tule Lake was designated a "Segregation Center" rather than a detention center. This was to house those who refused a loyalty oath which was forced upon all internees age 17 and older). From Tule Lake, Okamoto wrote a letter to James Omura about his plight, and Omura replied the day he got the letter (document 18).[26] Omura was in full sympathy, and could not “agree that this is the American kind of justice as I understand it under our constitutional form of government.” He assured Okamoto of his support in this matter. Omura believed the camp director Robertson was “attempting to demolish the Fair Play Committee by railroading out its most militant and aggressive leaders."

Omura decided to clarify his reasons for support of the FPC in his editorials, as the JACL and WRA had charged Omura with encouraging others to resist the draft. Omura countered that his support for the FPC was based on its moderate principles. He hoped that by giving publicity to the movement it would discourage more rash movements such as those at Amache, where internees had expressed disloyalty to the United States. Omura’s efforts seemed to prove effective, as the Amache group later adopted the FPC stand.

Pressure continued to increase against Omura, and the FPC wrote a letter to go on record that Omura was in no way connected with the FPC (document 19).[27] The FPC also sought to further clarify its position to defend against growing misperception and slander. In the letter, the FPC denied encouraging draft evasion or violating selective service law. They declared, “That the aim of the FPC is to seek a clarification of our citizenship status and restoration of our Constitutional rights through Judicial pronouncement or by Congressional act.” The FPC asked the Shimpo to print the letter to try to settle the matter. The letter indicated the extent of the turmoil at the Heart Mountain Camp regarding issues of the draft and citizenship, as the FPC characterized its adversaries as “the bigoted JACL publication, the spineless, kow-towing Heart Mountain councilmaniacs, and the hypocritical WRA controlled Heart Mountain press.”

By May of 1944, the members of the FPC realized they were facing probable punishment for their actions. Okamoto wrote a letter (document 20)[28] attempting to reassure them that they were doing the right thing. He promised that the truth would some day be brought to light, and a day when “the Public will come to know of your integrity and courage.” He assured them that although their case may be decided against them, this was “a holy fight,” for themselves, their “children, the other Minorities of this Nation and for the Constitution and the Bill of Rights.” He also wrote about the news that the U.S. District Attorney had removed Omura from his job. (The Sentinel had announced Omura's ouster on the front page of its April 22, 1944 issue). Okamoto blamed Robertson, the Sentinel, and the Pacific Citizen for the faulty accusations against Omura for inciting the FPC into rebellion. Apparently the earlier statement from the FPC which assured Omura’s lack of involvement with the FPC had gone unheeded.

On June 26, 1944, about three weeks after D-Day, sixty-three Nisei waived the right to a jury and were found guilty in a mass trial by Judge T. Blake Kennedy for failing to report to pre-induction physicals (document 21 [29] and document 22 [30]). The headline of The Wyoming Eagle revealed how Nisei were viewed at the time, when they wrote, “63 Japs Are Given 3-Year Terms in Pen.” The headline recalled the saying, “once a Jap, always a Jap,” even if each of the 63 was born in this country and never actually was a Jap. According to the Eagle, Judge Kennedy felt that the Nisei's citizenship was indeed clarified when Congress ordered them to report for the draft. No further clarification was necessary. Although the question of relocation was not on trial, Kennedy took the liberty to comment on it anyway, defending the practice as necessary for the nation's defense. The judge said, “It's my personal opinion that most of these defendants deliberately chose a course which would result in their incarceration rather than to serve their country.” The judge did not sympathize with the FPC's plea that they were serving their country.

The Heart Mountain Sentinel labeled the three year terms as “Years of Uselessness” for sixty-three men (document 23).[31] They characterized the sixty-three as blindly following “the word and advice of the self-appointed prophets of the Fair Play Committee.” The Sentinel reported that “a number of the youths... wanted to change their minds and enter the armed services,” but, again, aware of the importance of others’ opinions, that “was impossible because they would certainly lose face with their codefendants.” The Sentinel failed to explain how they were privy to the thoughts of these youths. The Sentinel pointed out that, “even after they have served their sentences they will face an outside world decidedly unfriendly to slackers.” There was no acknowledgment that the sixty-three thought they were standing up for something they deemed important; instead the article focused on the personal embarrassment of having to serve time. The Sentinel called for even heavier sentences on the leaders, who would be tried in October.

The day after the trial of the sixty-three, a young man named Jimmie Akutsu from the Minidoka Relocation Center wrote James Omura. Akutsu wondered if he could be accused of removing government property regarding a previous incident, and shared his desire to avoid the draft. Omura replied to Akutsu (see document 24)[32] that in the present climate,

A person of Japanese ancestry can be accused of almost anything, and the manufactured hysteria of hatred toward all things Japanese at present would revolve to his detriment regardless of his innocence and non-complicity.

Omura sympathized with Akustu's wish to deny the draft board, but emphasized that that would not be the best course. He wrote that, “in times of war, I feel that the extent we can go is to file a protest but to comply with the requirements however much we may resent their imposition.” The reason he was in favor of the FPC's actions was that it could reach the Supreme Court and establish a precedent. However, he welcomed more explanation of Akutsu's personal feelings as to why he wanted to resist the draft, although he was “familiar with the various facets of this problem as concerns the individual Nisei.”

On November 2, 1944, the seven leaders of the FPC (Kiyoshi Okamoto, Paul Nakadate, Isamu "Sam" Horino, Minouro Tamesa, Ben Wakaye, Guntaro Kubota, and Frank Emi (who ironically was not 1A since he had a wife and child)) were found guilty and ordered to serve four years at Leavenworth for “aiding and abetting persons to evade registration or service in the land or sea forces of the United States, and conspiracy" (see document 25).[33] James Omura was also charged, but found not guilty, probably due to the fact that he was never a member of the FPC; he was merely sympathetic to their views.

The following day, The Wyoming Tribune (see document 26)[34] featured a story about a Nisei war hero who had nothing but contempt for the recently convicted leaders of the FPC. Sgt. Ben Kuroki characterized their activities as “A stab in the back.” The Tribune used that grisly quote to open the article and catch their readers. The misunderstanding among Nisei was still evident, as the decorated Nisei airman referred to the FPC leaders, saying,

These men are Fascists in my estimation and no good to any country. They have torn down all the rest of us have tried to do. I hope that these members of that Fair Play Committee won't form the opinion of America concerning all Japanese-Americans.

Earlier, Kuroki had met the resisting Nisei at Heart Mountain, and found that they “didn't know what they were talking about, [it was] obvious that the influencing agent was the Fair Play Committee,” as if the FPC somehow had controlling power over the minds of the ignorant. The paper did not mention that the Heart Mountain Sentinel sponsored his visit, as the reading public would probably not be aware of the similarities between Kuroki's views and the Sentinel's. The article did not mention that Kuroki had just served as a witness for the prosecution against the FPC leaders, where he went on record to call them fascists. Nor did it mention that in speaking to the Heart Mountain public that “a few of the men had a strong desire to beat him up.”[35]

Despite the apparent turmoil at the Heart Mountain Relocation Center, most eligible Nisei did in fact register for the draft. Historian Arthur Hansen summed up the numbers.

Even at Heart Mountain, 700 men reported for their physicals, 385 were inducted, 11 were eventually killed in battle, while 52 others were wounded. Totally, some 13,500 Nisei men from the ten camps entered the U.S. Army. More than 75% of them—or put another way, more than 50% of all eligible Nisei males— saw army service in the 442^nd Regimental Combat Team during its 225 days of heavy combat in Italy and France in 1944-45. This represented the highest percentage of eligible males of any racial or ethnic group assigned to a World War II combat unit, and this situation resulted in more than 700 deaths and 9486 casualties. When President Truman received the 442^nd on the White House lawn on 15 July 1946, he told them, “You fought not only the enemy but you fought prejudice—and you have won.[36]

President Harry Truman later offered the draft resisters a blanket pardon shortly after the war. But the misunderstanding between two groups of Nisei, some preaching public acceptance and others defending their individual liberties, led to a bitterness that only recently has begun to soften. James Omura stood as an example of a victim of that bitterness. Despite his acquittal, the condemnation of the JACL dried up his employment opportunities, and he gave up journalism to become a gardener. He turned his back on other Japanese-American concerns, and was presumed dead until he showed up at a meeting in Seattle in the early 1980's regarding the old question of redress and compensation. However, after his death in 1994, he was proclaimed an American hero in the tradition of Thomas Paine, Henry David Thoreau, Martin Luther King, and Caesar Chavez.[37]

After years of accusations against members of the FPC for being traitors or spineless, the JACL over the past few years has recognized that the members of the FPC were acting as patriotically as those who went overseas. Members of a generation who had buried their stories from their children were finally coming out and being honored. Sixty years later, several members of the Fair Play Committee were willing to share their experiences when they were invited to symposiums. A PBS broadcast shared their story in 2002. Okamoto's promise was finally coming true, as the American public was coming to know of their integrity and courage. However, some former members of the FPC have expressed their concern for the 21^st century, as several U.S. citizens with dark skin and unusual names were being carted off to some place called Guantanamo.[38]